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ABSTRACT
During the mid 1980s, Navy medicine was under constant criticism by its users, its providers, and
members of Congress. Between FY85 and FY88, the number of outpatient visits declined 21 percent
within Navy Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs), while CHAMPUS outpatient visits increased 78
percent. Dutring this same period, fleet operational assignments tripled and other programs were
implemented that reduced Navy's ability to provide patient care in the U.S. In addition, between
fiscal years 1980 through 1988, physician retention rates within Navy declined to 43 percent, lower
than the rates for Army and Air Force. According to the GAO, one of the chief complaints of all
military physicians is inadequate levels of administrative/clerical support. Thus, it has become
increasingly important that Navy manpower requirements be determined with increased accuracy to
maximize MTF productivity. This study uses regression analysis to evaluate the functional
relationship between administrative staff mix and physician productivity across similar hospitals,
tocusing on workcenters in the primary care areas, where the need is greatest. Data used in this study
is from the Medical Expense and Reporting System (MEPRS). Unfortunately, when comparing
hospitals the data appear to he inadequate for demonstrating a relationship between
administrative/clerical staffing and physician productivity, although when comparing workcenters the
results appear more promising.
•TI- '. -., 'A' F]
-D~t .. -" - I
VlDi;
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................. ................... 1
A. BACKGROUND ................. .................. 1
B. PHYSICIAN ATTRITION ............ ............. 3
C. THE PROBLEM ............. ... ................. 5
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ............ ............. 5
E. SCOPE ................... .................... 6
F. METHODOLOGY ............. ... ................. 7
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS ........ .......... 7
II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW ........ ......... 9
A. THE MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM .... ..... 9
1. CHAMPUS Increases .......... ............ 10
2. Declines in Productivity Within the Direct
Care System ......... .............. 11
3. Physician Retention .... ........... 14
B. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY .... .......... 18
1. Administrative/Clerical Support ... ..... 18
2. Specialty Requirements ... ......... 20
C. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION .... .......... 22
1. Efficiency Review .... ............ 23
2. Joint Healthcare Manpower Standards
(JHMS) ........... ................. 24
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY ............ .................. 28
III. PRODUCTIVITY ............. .................. 29
iv
A. EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY ... ......... 29
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...... ............. 32
C. PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES ....... ............ 34
1. Trends in Physician Productivity . . .. 36
a. Civilian Productivity Trends . . .. 36
b. Trends Within The Direct Care
System ......... .............. 37
D. PRODUCTION FUNCTION ....... ............. 40
1. Dependent Variables .... ........... 40
2. Independent Variables ... .......... 42
E. THE DATA ............ ................... 45
IV. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS ......... ............... 47
A. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ...... ............. 47
B. REGRESSION RESULTS (ALL HOSPITALS) ...... .. 48
1. Total Annual Visits .... ........... 48
2. Factor Analysis ...... ............. 51
C. REGRESSION RESULTS (WORKCENTER) .. ....... 55
1. Family Practice ...... ............. 57
2. Internal Medicine .... ............ 59
3. Pediatrics ......... ............... 59
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........ .............. 61
A. SUMMARY ............... ................... 61
B. CONCLUSION ............ .................. 62
C. FUTURE STUDIES .......... ................ 62
v
APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY........................................64
APPENDIX B. JOINT HEALTHCARE MANPOWER STANDARDS
(JHMS)....................................................67
APPENDIX C. MEDICAL EXPENSE AND PERFORMAN4CE REPORTING
SYSTEM...................................................70






During the mid 1980s, Navy medicine was under constant
criticism by its users, providers and members of Congress.
Its ability to meet wartime requirements and peacetime demand
continually declined while Civilian Health and Medical Program
of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) costs were rapidly rising.
Users felt they were not receiving quality care iRef. Ii,
while physicians were frustrated with the lack of diversity in
case mix and increasing administrative burdens. In fiscal
year (FY) 1990, the Navy provided medical care to a
beneficiary population of around 1.8 million at an annual cost
of over $992 million [Ref. 21. During the period FY 1985
through FY 1988, the number of "direct care" outpatient visits
declined 21 percent while CHAMPUS outpatient visits increased
78 percent. In addition, Naw inpatient admissions declined
17 percent while CHAMPUS admi-sions increased by 42 percent
(Ref. 31. Concurrently, fleet operational assignments tripled
from 1982 through 1987, and additional programs were
implemented that all resulted in fewer resources available to
provide care to the beneficiaries in the United States. For
these and other reasons, in 1988 the Secretary of the Navy
established a Navy Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) to make
recommendations to improve beneficiary access and reduce
1
CHAMPUS dependency by making Military Treatment Facilities
(MTFs) more efficient. Another objective of the BRP was to
improve Graduate Medical Education. [Ret. 4i Chaired by
the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO), the BRP reported
its findings and recommendations in November 1988. One
recommendation, BRP (CO-13), which was approved by the
Secretary of the Navy, was to define the administrative
/clerical requirements to support direct patient care. Once
defined, these resources were to be allocated to facilities
demonstrating the most need. Further, increased productivity
targets were to be established for each facility proportional
to the administrative/clerical support received [Ret. 51.
In FY 1989, requirements were identified resulting in the
authorization of an additional 329 clerical positions that
same year and 27 positions during FY 1990. Ten MTFs were
selected to receive these personnel. In October 1991, upon
request of the Flag Level Working Committee (FLWC)
(responsible for monitoring results of the BRP initiatives),
a review of actual benefits derived from these additional
billets was conducted by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
(BUMED). [Ref. 61 Despite the noted improvements in
workload, there is little indication, given the lack of
quantitative data, that the workload increases were the direct
result of these additional clerical assets or that
productivity actually improved. In addition, during FY 1991
DoD imposed a civilian hiring freeze which prevented the
2
routine replacement of personnel. However, exception was
granted to the medical community in the form of waivers, given
the need for administrative/clerical support and other medical
personnel. While the waivers allowed for routine personnel
replacements, although unvalidated, higher personnel turnover
was observed among the lower grade (GS-4/5) clerical workers
as they became eligible for other positions within DoD.
[Ret. 71. Physicians still argue that their opportunity to
provide patient care is diminished because of the
administrative burden placed on them due to lack of
administrative/clerical support. Retention rates remain low,
particularly among certain wartime and peacetime specialties.
Physician shortages resulting from lower retention reduce the
MTFs' ability to maximize the utility of its personnel and
facility resources.
B. PHYSICIAN ATTRITION
Between 1985 and 1988 the percentage of physicians leaving
the military rose from 13.7 to 15.6 [Ref. 81. Concerned,
the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel and
Compensation, House Committee on Armed Services, asked the
Government Accounting Office (GAO) to determine why more
physicians were leaving. Based on a survey of approximately
1,500 physicians the GAO reported that, in total, physicians
who intended to leave ran parallel to historical attrition
rates within DoD. In addition, "almost one half of the active
3
duty physicians indicated at least a 70 percent probability of
leaving service when they became eligible and about two-thirds
had a 50 percent chance of leaving" as shown in Table 1.
[Ret. 1) Of particular note, Navy physicians were more
likely to leave than Army and Air Force (except 70 percent or
greater) and the likelihood of physicians leaving is greater
during the initial obligation.
Table 1. PHYSICIANS PLANNING TO LEAVE THE MILITARY UPON
COMPLETION OF THEIR OBLIGATION
Figures are percentages Stated Probability
of Leaving
PHYSICIAN CATEGORY 70% or > 50% or >
Overall 47 62
Army 41 58
Air Force 52 63
Obstetricians/Gynecologists 60 74
Surgeons 51 67
Internal Medicine 46 64
Primary Care 42 56
Support Medicine 71 78
Beyond Initial Obligation 28 42
Source: GAO/HRD-90-1, Military Physicians' Views on Military
Medicine, Mar 90 (highlight added)
After reviewing these factors, GAO concluded that the
probability of leaving is primarily influenced by:
- time spent on non-physician tasks,
- disparity between military and civilian compensation, and
- lack of opportunity to practice in primary specialty.
4
GAO further concluded that attrition could be most effectively
reduced by increasing compensation and reducing the amount of
non-physician tasks performed [REt. 101 In this report,
non-physician tasks included work that should have been
performed by clerks and/or technicians.
C. THE PROBLEM
As previously stated, MTF productivity has not been
maximized, in part, due to the shortage of military physicians
which results partly from a lack of adequate
administrative/clerical support. The issue for Navy manpower
planners remains determining the administrative/clerical
requirements that will improve productivity within Navy MTFs.
To examine this issue this thesis will look at the variation
in the administrative/clerical staff among Navy hospitals
compared to Army and Air Force hospitals.
D. -'1 SEARCH OBJECTIVES
Of primary interest is determining the factors that
explain the variation in administrative/clerical staffing
patterns among Navy hospitals with similar characteristics and
whether the same variation exists among the other branches of
service. Secondary questions this thesis will address are:
1. Can the contribution of the administrative/clerical
staff to productivity be determined for use in forecasting
future staff requirements?
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2. Does the Navy employ administrative/clerical personnel
more or less efficiently than the Army and/or Air Force?
By understanding the relationship between the
administrative/clerical complement and physician productivity,
it may be possible to develop a model that forecasts future
staff requirements. By accurately identifying and servicing
clerical needs, physician productivity can be maximized,
allowing them to see more patients without negative impact on
the quality of care. Improvement in physician productivity
implies improvement in hospital productivity, holding all
other factors constant.
E. SCOPE
This thesis will use regression analysis to evaluate the
functional relationship between administrative staff mix and
physician productivity across similar hospitals, focusing on
work centers where the need for physicians is greatest. Since
data is not yet available for FY 1992 and results using FY
1991 data may be skewed due to Operation Desert Storm, the
analysis will be conducted using data from FY 1990. Workload
and performance data will be obtained from the Medical Expense
and Performance Reporting System (MEPRS) as obtained via
direct link to the Defense Manpower Information System (DMIS)
and as obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).
6
F. METHODOLOGY
Acting on behalf of the primary beneficiary of services
(the patient), physicians utilize various hospital services
and are, therefore, the primary customer (surrogate consumer)
of hospital-based health care services. Assuming clinical
judgments are correct and holding all other factors constant,
physician productivity will be evaluated in terms of the
administrative/clerical complement. Since not all physician
specialties are at risk, only those specialties most needed to
meet the Navy's current and anticipated future needs will be
assessed. Within this context, this thesis will examine the
effect that the administrative/clerical staff has on hospital
productivity, using a single measure of physician productivity
as a surrogate.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis will be organized to provide a logical
progression to the development of a model that seeks to
explain the relationship between physician productivity and
administrative/clerical support. Chapter II will provide the
reader with a description of current manpower standards and
how they are derived. It will also provide an overview of
MEPRS: how workload is reported and performance is measured.
Chapter III will describe the research methodology and
describe the variables used in the model. Chapter IV is the
analysis of the data, including limitations of the data and/or
7
the research. Finally, chapter V will provide conclusions and
recommendations for follow-on research.
II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
A. THE MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM
The Military Health Services System (MHSS) is an immensely
large and complex organization comprised of the three branches
of service, Army, Navy and Air Force (the direct care system)
and the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services (CHAMPUS). The direct care system includes 148
hospitals, over 800 medical and dental clinics, and an active
workforce of approximately 400,000 military, reserve, and
civilian personnel. The MHSS serves a beneficiary population
of nearly 9 million. [Ref. Ill Serving as principal
adviser to the Secretary of Defense on DoD policies and
programs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
(ASD(HA)) is also responsible for the management and
supervision of the MHSS. Functioning rather independently,
each branch of service has a Surgeon General who reports to
the service chiefs, who in turn report to their respective
service secretaries, as shown in Figure 1. Note: OCHAMPUS
reports directly to the OASD(HA). In the past the "ability of
the ASD(HA) to ensure effective implementation of
congressional and Department of Defense intent in the medical
arena has been limited and often criticized." [Ref. 12)
However, in an effort to control the increases in healthcare
costs and declining workloads, the role of the OASD(HA) has
9
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been expanded and its authority strengthened. Simultaneously
and using a more collaborative approach, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD(HA)) and the service
components are continually seeking ways to contain costs,
improve productivity and correctly identify resource
requirement s.
1. CHAMPUS Inmreases
As reported to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
by GAO in July 1989, since 1985 CHAMPUS costs have increased
10
at twice the rate of the non-CHAMPUS portion of the DoD's
healthcare expenditures, as shown in Table 2 [Ref. 13!.
Increased use of non-availability statements and decreases in
both the number of outpatient visits and inpatient admissions
(within the direct care system) are three primary reasons for
the rapid increase in CHAMPUS costs.
Table 2. DOD MEDICAL CARE COSTS
(in millions) FY85 FY86 FY87 % CHANGE
CHAMPUS 1,371 1,735 1,964 43.2
NON-CHAMPUS 7,841 8,651 9,532 21.6
TOTAL 9,212 10,386 11,496 24.8
Source: GAO/HRD-89-47, "Workload Reductions at Military Hospitals Have
Increased Champus Costs," July 90, p.10, FY85-FY87
2. Declines in Productivity Within the Direct Care System
Although there were other minor factors in addition to
those stated above that contributed to increased CHAMPUS
costs, collectively these minor factors accounted for
approximately 20 percent of the $690 million increase between
FY 85-87, as reported by the GAO in July 1989. The remaining
79 percent increase in CHAMPUS costs was the result of
reductions in workload at the Military Treatment Facilities
(MTFs), most of which were within the MTF catchment area and
experienced by Navy as indicated in Table 3. [Ref. 141
Several reasons were given by GAO for the decline in MTF
workload. Although the study acknowledged shortages in
11
physician staffing, the primary focus was on cost containment
initiatives such as CHAMPUS Reform Initiative (CRI),
partnerships, and contractor operated primary care clinics.
Table 3. CHANGES IN INPATIENT ADMISSIONS AND OUTPATIENT
VISITS BETWEEN FISCAL YEARS 1985 AND 1987
Change in Change in
Inpatient Percent Outpatient Percent
Branch Admissions Change Visits Change
Army 400 0 -243,000 -02
Navy -44,900 -32 -2,200,000 -33
Air Force -19,500 -10 -199,000 -02
TOTAL 64,800 -42 -67,442,000 -37
Source: Adapted from GAO/HRD-89-47, "Workload Reductions at
Military Hospitals Have Increased CHAMPUS Costs,"
July 90, p.3.
A second GAO study interested in recapturing CHAMPUS
workload within the direct care system compared the costs of
providing patient care services under three scenarios -
military, civilian or contract providers. They first
calculated the occupancy rate based on "designed" bed capacity
(number of beds that wards or rooms were designed to hold).
An average occupancy rate of 45 percent was calculated for all
hospitals within the direct care system. Since this
definition does not take into account the number of beds the
MTF has resources to staff (which may be/often is
substantially fewer), the rate calculated is understated and
gives the MTF the appearance of being less productive. They
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then ranked all hospitals in terms of workload reductions and
increased CHAMPUS costs. The six facilities with the highest
ranking, indicating the poorest performers, were selected for
the study. [Ref. 151 GAO concluded that the potential
for savings appeared significant, but realizing these savings
would be limited. The "type, availability, and source of
additional staff needed" was one of the five limitations cited
[Ref. 161. This staff limitation is further constrained
by uncontrollable factors external to the facility and the
MHSS.
First, the number of active duty personnel is
constrained by Congressionally imposed ceilings, which makes
the workload-driven procurement of medical officers, nurses
and enlisted technicians difficult. Second, the ready
substitution of military medical personnel by civilian federal
employees is also constrained because of the lack of salary
competitiveness between federal salaries and the civil sector
labor market. The third constraining factors is the slow and
cumbersome process of acquiring staff through contracts
because of the lack of responsiveness to medical marketplace
forces. Also important with respect to the first constraint
is the fact that, in some specialties, year end strength has
fallen below the authorized (imposed) levels across all
branches of service as indicated in Table 4. In FY 1990, for
example, all specialties listed were undermanned for all
services, except pediatricians and anesthesiologists who were
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undermanned in only the Navy and Air Force [Ref. 17].
Apart from the obvious differences in budgeted end-strengths
one explanation might be the retention factor for each of the
services.
3. Physician Retention
As part of the OSD Health Professionals Special Pays
Study, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) conducted a study
comparing physician retention rates among Army, Navy and Air
Force. The purpose of the study was to evaluate the need for
a new special pay program. In the aggregate physician
continuation rates showed little changes between fiscal years
1980 and 1988, averaging 90 percent for Army and 88 percent
each for Navy and Air Force. However, retention rates
declined to 52 percent (Army), 43 percent (Navy) and 48
percent (Air Force) for those physicians at the end of their
initial obligation. [Ref. 181 Table 5 shows retention
rates for initial obligors disaggregated by specialty. The
Army has the highest retention rates in 17 of the 19
specialties, while both the Navy and Air Force has the lowest
rates in 9 of the 17 specialties. In addition, the lower
retention rates are not consistent across services, although
anesthesiology appears to be uniformly low. One reason for
this inconsistency is the accession source used by each
service to procure physicians. There are three basic sources,
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Table 4. PHYSICIAN YEAR-END STRENGTHS
Physician Budget Year End % Auth
Specialty Auth Strength Year End
Anesthesiology
Army 118 118 100
Navy 157 141 90
Air Force 114 92 81
Family Practice
Army 450 329 73
Navy 253 230 91
Air Force 442 419 95
General Internists
Army 208 169 81
Navy 117 100 85
Air Force 144 129 91
General Surgery
Army 208 169 81
Navy 117 100 85
Air Force 144 129 91
OB/GYN
Army 214 194 91
Navy 147 104 71
Air Force 204 196 96
Orthopedic
Army 170 125 74
Navy 142 99 70
Air Force 148 112 76
Pediatricians
Army 257 269 104
Navy 183 177 98
Air Force 274 251 92
Psychiatry
Army 218 171 78
Navy 117 100 85
Air Force 144 129 91
Source: DoD, Health Manpower Statistics, FY 1990
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Table 5. RETENTION RATES FOR PHYSICIANS AT THE END
OF INITIAL OBLIGATION, FY 1984-1987
Specialty Army Navy Air Force
All specialties 58 (1,957) 43 (1,328) 46 (1,554)
Anesthesiology 32 (84) 27 (74) 18 (50)
Cardiology 59 (44) 27 (15) 29 (14)
Dermatology 74 (54) 59 (17) 56 (16)
Emergency 38 (70) 44 (9) 25 (24)
Family Practice 51 (191) 47 (142) 48 (340)
Gastroenterology 53 (38) 18 (11) 17 (12)
General Surgery' 75 (145) 46 (76) 62 (133)
Internal Medicineb 58 (282) 44 (119) 45 (182)
Neurology 55 (38) 58 (12) 39 (18)
Neurosurgery 67 (15) 40 (5) 42 (12)
OB/GYN 54 (175) 31 (68) 42 (134)
Ophthalmology 55 (60) 55 (22) 31 (29)
Orthopedic Surgery 61 (132) 36 (33) 36 (58)
Otolaryngology 49 (39) 25 (24) 48 (29)
Pathology 80 (129) 51 (33) 59 (39)
Pediatrics 63 (156) 54 (68) 47 (152)
Psychiatry 63 (106) 54 (41) 47 (58)
Radiology 49 (127) 32 (75) 19 (96)
Urology 54 (50) 42 (26) 43 (28)
Other 70 (27) 71 (130)
Note: Population size in parentheses.
a. Includes general surgery, surgical oncology, colon-rectal surgery,
peripheral vascular surgery, and plastic surgery.
b. Excluding cardiology and gastroenterology.
Source: Graham, Amy E., "A Comparison of Physician Retention
in the Army, Navy and Air Force", Center for Naval
Analyses, June 1989
each of which require different initial obligations depending
on the amount of training the physician has received from the
military. One source, direct accessions, represents those
physicians entering the service fully trained, incurring the
least obligation (2-4 years) depending on the contract
agreement. It has the greatest apparent impact on initial
obligor accessions. Between 1984 and 1987 40 percent of Army,
33 percent of Navy and 16 percent of Air Force procurement,
were direct accessions. Another explanation may involve the
16
non-pecuniary aspects of military medicine and may differ by
branch of service. Assuming all physicians have the same
civilian opportunities for pay, then such factors as working
conditions and job satisfaction may influence their decision.
Several studies have been conducted specifically looking at
the retention behavior of military physicians (GAO 1989, GAO
1990). While the data for these studies have been based on
survey responses, in most cases, physicians feel they are not
adequately supported in terms of their administrative staff.
In fact, in the GAO study mentioned in Chapter I (reference
8), 86 percent of the physicians surveyed indicated that there
were too few clerks, receptionists and secretaries. Initial
obligors reported spending an average of 11.3 hours per week
on non-physician tasks. [Ref. 191 GAO concluded that
reducing the amount of non-physician tasks could result in an
estimated decrease in the probability of their leaving of 44
percent for initial obligors and 20 percent for all others.
Most of the studies discussed in this section have all
focused on reducing CHAMPUS expenditures and improving
hospital productivity through various alternatives. During
the period of these studies it appears that Navy MTFs have
been less productive based on declining workload. Equally,
Navy physicians are more dissatisfied with their working
conditions, and have lower overall retention rates than their
counterparts in the other services. Based on the assumptions
that (1) appropriate levels of administrative/clerical
17
personnel will positively influence physician retention rates,
and (2) the potential for CHAMPUS savings is greater when
providing patient care through the direct care system, a
determination of administrative/clerical staffing requirements
provides system-wide benefits. However, rather than rely on
somewhat subjective analyses, such as those provided by self-
assessment, more quantitative analysis is needed to determine
exact staffing requirements.
B. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
1. Administrative/Clerical Support
During fiscal year 1987, prior to the establishment of
the Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP), the Bureau of Medicine and
Surgery (BUMED), formerly Commander, Naval Medical Command
(COMNAVMEDCOM), conducted a study of the deficiencies in total
clerical support assets. From this study, 411 additional
clerical positions were identified for Navy MTFs. The
Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) approved these additional
clerical assets without additional funding, and restricted
their placement to the direct support of medical care
functions. Without funding by SECNAV, the costs of providing
additional personnel had to be borne out of COMNAVMEDCOM's
(now BUMED) existing budget. When asked by the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) to demonstrate the recapture of CHAMPUS
workload, "no strong connection" could be made between changes
in CHAMPUS productivity and/or changes in MTF productivity,
18
because "no measurable productivity indicators were requested,
and COMNAVMEDCOM (now BUMEDI did not initially direct
activities to maintain such data." 1Ret. 201.
Following the BRP recommendation and approval by
SECNAV, Congress authorized an additional $15 million for
medical personnel for FY 1989, some of which was used for
clerical support. In FY 1990, Congress authorized another $50
million. Of the 904 civilian requirements identified, 440
were clerical support positions for patient care areas.
Clearly, the intent of SECNAV was to support direct patient
care. However, because managing to payroll gives the local
MTF commander the authority to hire based on local needs,
hiring practices and financial constraints, there is no
guarantee that positions will be created and/or maintained as
intended by higher authority. Nonetheless, between FY 1987
and FY 1990, over 1,000 civilian clerical personnel were added
to the rolls of BUMED activities, the largest gains occurring
during the unfunded periods, FY 1987 (274) and FY 1988 (707).
[Ref. 211 Why then in 1990 were physicians still
dissatisfied with the level of administrative/clerical
support? Possible explanations may include:
- False perceptions by physicians )f their needs
- Inefficient use of staff by workcenter managers
- Physicians were not the beneficiaries of the needed
additional staff
19
- Actual requirements were not correctly identified
because the relationship to physician output has not
been quantified
2. Specialty Requirements
Much has been said thus far about workload and
retention and the problems in these areas that make
requirements determination and productivity important issues
for manpower planners. However, several other factors are
equally important, particularly in the midst of a changing
healthcare environment. Prior to the end of the cold war, the
dual mission of Navy medicine had both complementary and
conflicting effects. The critical wartime specialties,
general surgery anesthesiology, orthopedic surgery and
neurosurgery, could be applied in peacetime to treat eligible
beneficiaries. Other peacetime specialty requirements include
internal medicine, psychiatry, pediatrics, and
obstetrics/gynecology, where demand exceeds the available
resources according to BRP findings. Today, however, with the
demise of the cold war, redefinition of the national threat,
and the need to contain healthcare costs, the distinction
between critical wartime specialties and those needed during
peacetime are becoming more balanced as the MHSS moves towards
an environment of managed care. [Ref. 221
The Coordinated Care Program (CCP) established in 1992
by OASD(HA) represents military medicine's adoption of a
managed- care philosophy. Although the medical mission
remains dual in nature, under CCP the military departments
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(services) can better accomplish their medical missions by
improving beneficiary access and controlling healthcare costs
at the local MTF level. Central to the concept of managed
care is the establishment and management of a "network" of
health care providers and organizations based on local MTF
capabilities, needs and costs. Two of the guiding principles
of CCP are (1) decentralized management and authority at the
local MTF level, and (2) centralized direction and monitoring
by the Services and OASD(HA). One of the key features of the
program is the delivery of care. Central to the delivery of
care is a primary care provider, "a specific primary care
clinic, site, provider or group of providers, with which each
enrolled beneficiary will establish and maintain an ongoing
medical affiliation." [Ref. 23] Primary care physicians
act as "gatekeepers", managing the total care for each patient
and controlling utilization, therefore, attendant healthcare
costs.
Another consideration is the supply of physicians in
the civil sector labor market from which to draw military
physicians. With the growing trend toward an "overproduction
of specialists and an underproduction of generalists (i.e.
family physicians, general internists, and general
pediatricians) ... 50 percent of the U.S. physicians
graduating should be generalists." [Ref. 241 Table 6
shows the distribution of all federal and non-federal
physicians in 1990. For comparative purposes, it also shows
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the distribution percentages for military physicians on active
duty. In the three wartime specialties listed the
distribution within the military falls one percentage point
below those within the civilian sector. However, within the
primary care specialties, the distribution within the military
falls 2 percentage points or greater below their civilian
counterparts, except family practice. These lower
distributions reflected in Table 6, coupled with the manning
rates in Table 4, the retention rates in Table 5, and the
"reduced emphasis on the surgical specialties" (Reference 22)
indicate the need to maintain or improve physician staffing
and productivity in the primary care area.
C. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION
This thesis presupposes that there is a quantifiable
relationship between physician satisfaction and productivity
and the clerical staff which will be described further in
Chapter III. However, before moving directly into that
discussion this section of the chapter will describe the
current method mandated by OASD(HA) to define health
manpower personnel requirements and discuss current literature
on this subject.
Two programs focusing entirely on the determination of
manpower requirements are Efficiency Review (ER) and the Joint
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Table 6. DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL AND NON-FEDERAL PHYSICIANS
Civilian Sector Military Services
Specialty Number Percent Number Percent
Total 600,789 4 13,795 3
Anesthesiology 25,367 8 351 7
Family Practice 46,302 6 978 4
General Surgery 38,240 6 533 4
OB/GYN 33,095 6 494 4
Orthopedic Surgery 18,741 3 336 2
Pediatrics 39,457 7 696 5
Psychiatry 34,540 6 400 3
Internal Medicine 97,486 16 586 4
All others 267,561 44 9,421 68
Sources:
Civilian Data: Physician Characteristics and Distribution in
the U.S., 1990 Edition
Military Data: DoD, Health Manpower Statistics, FY 1990
Healthcare Manpower Standards (JHMS), mandated by the
Secretary of Defense and the OASD(HA), respectively. While
both programs are designed to provide quantitative methods to
determine manpower requirements, the JHMS is an integral part
of the ER process.
1. Efficiency Review
The accurate identification of personnel needs and
efficient facility operations are of key concern throughout
the Department of Defense. In fact, DoD policy states that:
DoD Components shall manage, provide resources, and
evaluate programs based on output performance requirements
and standards documented in performance work statements
(PWSs). The ER process shall be the basis for continued
and directed efforts for productivity, performance,
efficiency and effectiveness improvement. (Ref. 251
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Within the Department of the Navy,
the ER process reviews and assesses workload in terms of
the activity's mission, functions and tasks; objectively
reviews and determines the equipment and processes
necessary for the activity to efficiently and effectively
discharge its mission and tasks; determines the number and
defines the skills and mix of military, civilian, and/or
contractor manpower resources required based on
measured/validated workloads/tasks; and provides claimant
the flexibility, due to having a workload based staffing
guide or other recognized analytical tool, to adapt
personnel strength requirements as programs or mission
changes occur. [Ref. 261
The key feature of ER is that it is designed to determine
manpower requirements based on a thorough review of the whole
facility (i.e. a Naval Treatment Facility) using a variety of
quantitative methods that result in the most efficient
utilization of resources.
2. Joint Healthcare Manpower Standards (JHMS)
Upon recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) and
by direction of the Secretary of Defense, in July 1985, a
joint service project team was established to develop a
"joint" staffing methodology. In March 1989, OASD(HA) issued
the first set of JHMS for use by all DoD Components and the
Military Services. Two of the five objectives of the JHMS are
to provide:
1. Military healthcare management a uniform process for
determining requirements and applying military treatment
facility staffing standards,
2. A method for forecasting healthcare manpower
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requirements based on mission and/or service population
changes. (Ret. 271
The JHMS apply to fixed Military Treatment Facilities
(MTFs) which provide direct patient care which includes all
hospitals, medical centers (i.e. teaching/referral facilities)
and branch clinics. Use of the standards requires the
collection of manpower and workload data that, when applied
consistently with the standard, results in the proper and
uniform distribution (mix) of personnel requirements. How a
standard is derived determines the type of classification it
receives and the degree to which they must be applied at the
local MTF level. There are three general classifications,
Types I, Types II and III, and Manpower Guide. [Ref. 281
Refer to Appendix B for a description of the types.
A discussion with the Navy Representative on the Joint
Healthcare Manpower Engineering Team (JHMET) indicated that it
was very difficult to determine (quantify) the technical and
clerical staff requirements based on utilization differences
among the hospitals and inconsistencies regarding the basic
organizational structure. During the first draft of the
development of the standards, physicians were asked to define
the work they did. Based on their responses preliminary
standards were developed that were met with unfavorable
response because the technical/clerical requirements were
understated. The standards were adjusted based on the work
physicians did that should have been performed by
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administrative support personnel. [Ref. 291 The
resulting standards allowed for more support staff, however,
below the extended provider level the JHMS may not reflect the
most accurate statement of requirements. As noted by the
services the standards were developed too quickly, have not
been validated, and do not address their specific needs."
[Ref. 30] Another possible shortcoming of the standard might
be the implied substitutability of technical and clerical
manpower. For example, the JHMS for Orthopedic services (DoD
76104) shows that for a non-GME facility with workload
(visits) between 662.2 and 4,2885.5 the staffing at the
various levels is as shown in Table 7. Note that technicians
and administrative/clerical requirements are considered
substitutable. This relationship is depicted in Figure 2.
There are two problems with this theory. First, it implies
that any combination of clerks and technicians along the equal
output curve yields maximum levels of output. While it is
agreed that a technician can perform some clerical functions,
clerical personnel cannot perform technical work center
functions, which suggest that these two labor inputs are
complements, not substitutes. Second, it represents false
savings - if clerks can be purchased at a lesser wage than
technicians then the cost minimizing facility will want to
hire more clerks, perhaps at the expense of the capacity to
perform patient services. These ideas are supported by
Fottler, who in 1972, stated "if two labor factors are treated
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Table 7. Joint Healthcare Manpower Standard for
Orthopedic Services
JOINT HEALTHCARE MANPOWER TABLE II
WORK CENTER TITLE/CODE: EXTRAPOLATION LIMITS:
Orthopaedic Services 662.159 - 4285.46918
DoD 6104 See Application Instructions
SPECIALTY TITLE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
Provider 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7
" Medical Technician 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5
"* Administrative Support 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
TOTAL 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 121 13 14
- I-I -I-.m m
SPECIALTY TITLE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
Provider 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 10 10 11
"* Metcal Technician 5 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 9 9
"* Administratlve Support 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
TOTAL 15 16 17 18 19 201 21 22 23 24
SPECIALTY TITLE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
Provider 11 12 12 13 13
* Medical Technician 10 10 10 10 11
* Administrative Support 4 4 5 5 5
TOTAL 25 26 27 281 291
* NOTE: Medical Technician and AdAinistrative Support requirements may be
substituted for one another according to Service/local needs.
Source: Joint Healthcare Manpower Standards
as substitutes but the result is a decline in the quality
of service, then the two labor factors are, in fact,
complements." [Ref. 311 While quality determinations
are beyond the scope of this thesis, it is assumed that
quality will decline based on the different levels of training
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Figure 2. Equal output Curve for the Substitution
of Administrative/Clerical personnel with
Technicians.
indicated by differences in the wages.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Collectively, these findings seem to suggest that as a
prerequisite Navy medicine must first determine the
relationship between the admini strat ive/ clerical support and
physician productivity. once this relationship is known
changes in productivity can be properly offset by changes in
the administrative/ clerical staff complement. The focus now
is to examine the impact that clerical staff has on physician
productivity, the subject of Chapter III.
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III. PRODUCTIVITY
A. EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY
Since a hospital is not a single product organization, the
concept of "hospital" efficiency has been difficult to clearly
define, particularly within the context of the "whole"
hospital. Efficiency, often used interchangeably with
productivity, has been commonly defined as the ratio of
outputs to inputs without regard to the quality of the output.
Simply, it means production at the lowest possible cost
(Ret. 321. Within business and industry the two most common
measures of efficiency are reductions in unit costs and
productivity. While productivity is a more sophisticated
measure than a simple cost reduction "it is less than a whole
concept of efficiency" for two reasons (Ref. 331. First,
the organizational inputs (land, labor and capital) are
diverse and cannot be added without first developing a common
measure, such as dollars. Then, equitably or not, the
indirect and overhead costs of support functions such as
radiology or outpatient records must be allocated to each
workcenter to determine the total cost of the product. The
second problem is that of defining standard units of
measurement for hospital outputs, that is, measures that
account for the differences in the complexity and intensity of
care. These factors are equally important when looking at
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efficiency at the workcenter or physician levels, as well.
Since this study is interested in productivity at the
physician level, it will not address the concept of hospital
efficiency, except to make the initial assumption that as the
physician's productivity improves so will the efficiency of
the hospital, holding all other factors constant. Stated
differently, physician productivity is highly correlated with
hospital efficiency.
At first glance, defining manpower productivity seems
pretty straightforward. "The average productivity of any type
of manpower is the 'output' produced by one unit of that
manpower during a given period IRet. 34]." However, in
healthcare, particularly regarding medical practice, defining
output poses conceptual problems. Measuring physician output
along the lines of impact to the patient's health seems
sensible, but is not easily accomplished empirically given the
vast array of inputs that must be controlled for. If it were
possible to predict patient health in the absence of physician
intervention then it might be possible to bridge the gap
between conceptual and empirical reality.
A more useful approach has been to view the physicians
output as "physician services" based on some index of the
volume of services rendered during a given period
(Ref. 351. Viewed this way, the physician assumes the
role of consultant. In addition, based on his/her medical
judgment as to what other services are required in both the
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diagnosis and treatment of the patient's condition, it is the
physician who uses the array of other services, while it is
the patient who benefits from them. In the civilian sector
this relationship could be depicted numerous ways depending on
the practicing status of the physician.
In private or group practice, for example, the physician
is free to choose "where" diagnostic and treatment services
come from. Within the military, this relationship does not
hold true unless the needed services cannot be provided within








Figure 3. Adapted from Reinhold, "The Role of Physician
Services in producing Health Care," p.65.
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B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Before discussing the methodology, this section will
describe the research hypothesis. Initially, the plan was to
compare Navy MTFs with civilian hospitals to test the
hypothesis that administrative and clerical staff personnel
were used less efficiently in Navy MTFs than in similar
civilian hospitals. This task turned out to be too difficult
given the differences in structure, workload reporting and
performance systems, and hiring practices of these two types
of organization (military and civilian) . Comparisons were in
fact, virtually impossible. Equally discouraging were the
distinct differences in the organizational environments in
which military and civilian physicians practice medicine. As
a result of these differences and difficulties, the idea of
using civilian hospitals as the comparative group was
abandoned. Instead, given the previously discussed decrements
in workload and increased physician retention problems, the
three branches of service were selected as the comparison
groups. A second factor that makes these groups more
appealing is the availability of consistent data. In
addition, even though the three branches of service have the
common factor of being military organizations, it is assumed
that enough difference exists among the services with respect
to mission and organizational style to account for the
variation that is expected to be observed. In other words,
although the group of military physicians may be homogenous
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within each branch of service, there may be differences when
comparing physician work output among the services. While the
basic focus of this research is still that of examining the
variation in the utilization of administrative/clerical
personnel and the impact of this staff component on physician
productivity, the initial hypothesis was adjusted. Navy
physicians, because of their higher levels of dissatisfaction
and lower rates of retention, are expected to be less
productive than their counterparts in the Army and Air Force
due to the reduced availability of administrative and clerical
staff personnel. Although a variety of methods exist to
examine this issue, regression analysis will be used because
of its ability to describe the functional relationship between
physician productivity and the factors that influence
productivity. Also, in the absence of prior military research
on this subject, the results of this study will serve as a
point of departure for future research. To test this
hypothesis five steps are required:
1. Establish physician productivity measures
2. Determine the physician production function
3. Collect the data
4. Conduct comparative analysis
5. Interpret results
The remainder of this chapter will discuss steps 1 through
3 while steps 4 and 5 will be discussed in Chapter IV.
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C. PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES
In the absence of specific data, historical physician
productivity measures were estimated using proxies. Some of
the more popular measures included (1) annual gross receipts
or annual expenditures; and (2) periodic ratios of physician-
patient visits, indicating volume on an hourly, weekly or
annual basis. Using gross receipts or expenditures does not
accurately reflect physician productivity because included in
these figures are the services of ancillary and auxiliary
staff. An increase in gross receipts could imply an increase
in productivity, whereas an increase in expenditures could
imply a decrease. This is also true within the military where
final workcenter costs include both the direct and indirect
costs associated with producing healthcare. Further, this
sort of data is unavailable at the local MTF level because of
differences in funding and local accounting procedures.
IRSf. 361 More recent studies use patient volume data
to establish productivity ratios.
Using patient volume allows the researcher to separate
those activities actually performed by the physician from
those performed by other medical and nonmedical personnel. In
so doing, activities that the physician performs that are non-
physician tasks can be identified for reassignment to other
personnel or capital equipment. Accordingly, increases in
patient volume implies an increase in physician productivity
while the converse is true with decreases in the number of
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patients seen, ceteris paribus. However, caution must be
used in this interpretation since decreases may also reflect,
for example, increased severity or higher intensity of
services requiring more patient contact time. One way to
control for this possibility would be the inclusion of actual
patient contact time as obtained from the patient discharge
record; however, since quality is not the issue of this paper,
it will not be further addressed. Rather this study assumes
that all physician output is of the same quality and that
improved physician productivity will improve hospital
productivity to the extent that the hospital operates
efficiently and within the constraints of its organizational
mission and fiscal limitations.
Past analyses found that physician time input is the most
important determinant of physician productivity. According to
Hurdle and Pope, physician productivity has two components -
work effort and actual output. Work effort is defined as
physician hours per year while productivity is visits per
physician hour. Although their study focused on private
practice physicians, their method has useful military
application as well. However, their data is based on
estimates provided by physicians via survey, which may have
produced biased results. In addition, they did not account
for differences between physicians on fixed salaries and those
whose income is free to vary, which might also produce biased
results.
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One advantage of this research is the relative homogeneity
of military physicians. Since they all self-select into the
military their personal characteristics and preferences may be
similar, although differences with respect to branch-of-
service selection may exist. These differences may be
reflected in higher retention rates in the Army compared to
the Navy and Air Force as well as higher dissatisfaction rates
among Navy physicians.
1. Trends in Physician Productivity
a. Civilian Productivity Trends
During the period 1978-1984, annual civil sector
physician productivity was believed to have declined as noted
by Hurdle and Pope (1989). Their study attributed the
declines to increased intensity of case mix brought about by
a decline in hourly productivity rather than lower work effort
as had been posited by previous researchers. In addition,
they concluded that the number of nurses and administrative
aides is significantly and positively associated with
physician productivity. This was further supported by Pope in
another civil sector study in 1990 [Ref. 37[. Other
changes within the civilian community also provide indications
of the trends within the healthcare industry:
- The median number of beds decreased from 164 in 1986 to
152 in 1988. During this same period the average length of
stay (ALOS) experienced a 3 percent decline and the median
occupancy rate was 52.11 (in 1988), all indicating a
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downward shift in the use of inpatient hospital services.
- Case mix complexity also increased an average of 2.6
percent per year since 1984 reflecting greater case
intensity, probably due to an aging population.
- Staffing levels also decreased. The median number of FTE
personnel per adjusted average daily census declined from
4.33 in 1987 to 4.28 in 1988, indicating an increase in
operating efficiency.
- Outpatient utilization increased. [Ret. 38J
b. Trends Within The Direct Care System
Similar changes have occurred within the
military. From the period 1987-1991 the number of MEPRS
direct care admissions declined 8.5 percent as did the Average
Daily Patient Load (APDL) by 20 percent.
Total visits increased 1.8 percent, with the
largest gain in the Air Force in FY90 and decline in FY91.
[Ref. 39J Both Army and Navy have experienced steady
growth from 1987 to 1990 with only slight increases as
depicted in Figure 4.
Within the primary care areas total visits have
declined slightly for Air Force, while increasing for both
Army and Navy as shown in Figure 5. Family practice visits
appear to be declining for Air Force while increasing for both
Army and Navy. In addition, Navy family practice visits
declined sharply between fiscal years 85 through 87, then
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fluctuations for Army and Air Force. Navy pediatric visits
decline sharply between fiscal years 85 through 87, remained
constant between 1987 and 1988 with growth during 1990 and
1991.
D. PRODUCTION FUNCTION
Physician productivity is influenced by available
physician input hours, as well as other structural hospital
and staffing variables:
Q = f(F, S, H, L)
where Q = annual physician output (visits), F = physician time
input, S = vector of structural variables, H = the vector of
hospital variables and L = the vector of non-physician labor
inputs. Excluded from the function are the personal physician
attributes such as age, sex, nationality that may also affect
practice style and productivity, this exclusion being due to
insufficient data. Ideally, some measure of these personal
variables should be included. The omission of these variables
could lead to a bias in the estimated effects of the included
variables.
1. Dependent Variables
A single measure of physician productivity will be
used as the dependent variable in estimating the production
function: Total visits (TOTVIS), which incudes both annual
inpatient and outpatient visits. Annual outpatient visits
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include all presentations of eligible beneficiaries to an
organized clinic or specialty service for examination,
diagnosis, treatment, evaluation, consultation, or medical
advice or is treatments in personal quarters that are
documented in patient medical records. Total visits include
not only these outpatient visits but also those visits that
show as expenses in non-ambulatory accounts, including special
programs as well as inpatient. Examples include visits by the
physician to inpatients on hospital wards and visits to the
physician from inpatients as well as Alcohol and Drug
Rehabilitation and community health services. Thus total
visits captures all physician workload. There are several
disadvantages with using this measure. First, patient care
provided by extended providers, for example, physician
assistants and nurse practitioners, also constitutes a visit
and is included in this figure which does not allow for the
isolation of productivity by the physician alone. Second,
those hospitals with non-independent branch clinics assigned
to them roll clinic visits into the figures reported for both
outpatient and total visit, thus masking the actual output of
the core hospital. Finally, these measure do not capture any
of the effects of the quality of care rendered. Ideally, each
of these factors should be controlled for, but sufficient data
were not available. Consequently, caution must be exercised
when interpreting the results of the analysis.
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2. Independent Variables
Annual hours worked (CLINFTE) measures the amount of
physician work effort that went into producing patient care.
Since military physicians are not free to determine their own
work hours, it is not possible to know what their
labor/leisure preferences would be in the absence of military
constraints. A plausible substitute for input hours is the use
of full-time equivalent (FTE) because physician FTE includes
only the time the physician was available to the workcenter.
However, there is one disadvantage to using FTE. It includes
time spent at meetings and time spent on other non-physician
tasks performed in the workcenter. Although there is no
formal method to disaggregate time spent on non-physician
tasks from actual patient contact time, physicians estimate
this time to be approximately 10 percent (see reference 8,
page 30). Variations of any significance should occur among
the services rather than within a service, assuming that the
overall service medical mission and inherent organizational
service constraints are consistent. Table 8 provides all
independent variable definitions.
The hospital variables are those that are beyond the
control of the physician and the local facility commander that
affect efficiency. These include hospital type, occupancy
rate, and the relative case mix index.
Two dummy variables were created to separately assess
the effect of hospital type. Major teaching facilities
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(MAJTEACH) are defined as those that serve as referral centers
and have more than one residency program and those that are
medical centers or community-type hospitals with only one
residency program, for example, family practice. All other
facilities, defined as non-teaching hospitals (NONTEACH),
serve as the omitted group (n=89). Although previous studies,
in general, concluded that physicians in teaching facilities
Table 8. Determinants of Physician Productivity
DETERMINANT SYMBOL DEFINITION
Outpatient visits TOTOPV Annual number of outpatient visits
Total visits TOTVIS Total annual visits
Physician hours CLINFTE Total number of annual hours worked
measured in FTE
Hospital variables
Major teaching MAJTEACH Dummy variable = 1 if referral center
with 2 or more residency programs;
medical center/community hospital with 1
residency program, = 0 otherwise
Non-teaching NONTEACH Dummy variable = 1 if community hospital
0 = otherwise
Dod Component ARMY Dummy variable = 1 Army; 0 otherwise
NAVY Dummy variable = 1 if Navy; 0 otherwise
AIRFO Dummy variable = i if Air Force; 0 otherwise
Occupancy rate OCCUP Avg daily patient load (ADPL)/number OPBEDSRel
Case Mix Index RCMI Dod Adjusted Case Mix Index
Staffing variables
Clinician FTE CLINFTE Clinician Full time equivalent (FTE)
Professional PROFTE Professional FTE
Para-professional PARAFTE Para-professional FTE
Registered Nurse RNFTE Registered Nurse FTE
Administrative ADMFTE Administrative FTE
*RCMI is the CMI adjusted by the DoD base index of .8109
Note: For explanation of terms see Appendix A (glossary)
were less productive than physicians in non-teaching
hospitals, more recent studies are not reaching the same
conclusions. Kearl and Mainous (1993) concluded that there
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was no significant difference in the average number of
patients seen by Family Medical Center Physicians with or
without a student present. [Ret. 401 Given the priority
placed on teaching hospitals by DoD, major teaching facilities
are expected to have lower output than non-teaching
facilities.
Three dummy variables were created to measure the
effect of branch of service on productivity: ARMY, NAVY, and
AIRFORCE. Since AIRFORCE has the largest number of hospitals
(n=64), it represents the omitted condition.
The occupancy rate (OCCUP), the ratio of the average
daily patient load (ADPL) to the number of operating beds, is
a general measure of the extent to which capacity is utilized
and often serves as an indication of hospital efficiency
(Ref. 411. Increases in this rate suggest a greater use of
resources thus an implied increase in the demand for physician
time by inpatients. Consequently, higher occupancy rates
should decrease outpatient visits (OPV) productivity while
increasing total visits (TOTVIS) . It is not known whether the
effects will be equally offsetting.
The staffing variables include all other non-physician
labor inputs grouped into five categories:
- Clinicians (CLINFTE)
- Direct Care Professionals (PROFTE)
- Direct Care Para-professionals (PARAFTE)
- Registered Nurses (RNFTE)
- Administrative, Clerical and Logistics Staff (ADMFTE)
For each of these categories actual hours worked are divided
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by 168 to convert hours into full-time equivalents (FTEs).
All workload is reported by FTE annualized in the year-end
report which is consistent with industry norms. Increases in
FTE rates by the "other staff" inputs are expected to
positively affect the productivity measure, but with
diminishing marginal productivity. [Ref. 421
E. THE DATA
The data set consists of data for the 123 Army, Navy, and
Air Force hospitals located in the Continental United States
(CONUS). Branch clinics and non-fixed medical facilities were
excluded. Data for 1992 were unavailable and data for 1991
were atypical because of Operation Desert Storm; so data from
fiscal year 1990 only were utilized. The data were obtained
from the Defense Medical Information System (DMIS) which
gathers the data from a variety of sources. Catchment Area
Population and beneficiary demographics were obtained from the
Defense Enrollment Reporting System (DEERS). Biometric data
are reported through Service biometric offices and DEERS. The
Defense Medical Facilities Office (DFMO) reports facility
descriptive data; bed capacities and workload, performance and
expense information is obtained through the Medical Expense
and Performance Reporting System (MEPRS). Most of the data
used in this analysis is from MEPRS, which is described in
more detail in Appendix C. Data were also obtained from the
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) as a cross-reference;
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however, DMDC data are limited. As expected there were
discrepancies with the data, many having to do with how and
when data are reported.
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IV. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
A. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
The total number of CONUS military hospitals in the data
set are 123 - 35 for Army (29 percent), 24 for Navy (20%), and
64 for Air Force (52 percent). Although there are more Air
Force hospitals, their overall workload is less than that of
Army and Navy. In addition, 72 percent of Air Force hospitals
have 50 beds or less, compared to 27 percent in Army, and 30
percent in Navy. Table 9 is a listing of the means for
select variables within the data set. The means for Army and
Table 9. VARIABLE MEANS
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION* TOTAL ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE
Annual Dispositions 5782 9206 7085 3421
Occupied Bed Days 27405 43443 32538 16709
Catchment Population 49749 58254 83190 32558
DoD Adj Case Mix Index .9194 1.0212 .9334 .8585
Number Operating Beds 108 159 141 68
Average Length of Stay 3.9 4.1 4.4 3.5
Avg Daily Patient Load 79 126 94 47
Outpatient Visits 282501 428164 352575 174881
Total Visits 290464 448854 364070 176242
Clinician FTE 116 181 152 67
Professional FTE 44 70 58 25
Paraprotessional FTE 365 484 610 208
RN FTE 93 130 130 57
Administrative FTE 300 510 383 153
RN FTE/CLIN FTE .9 .85 1.2 .9
ADMIN FTE/CLIN FTE 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.0
PROFESS FTE/ CLIN FTE .5 .5 .6 .5
PARAPROF FTE/CLIN FTE 4.3 3.7 6.5 3.8
OPV/CLINFTE 2435 2366 2319 2610
TOTVIS/CLINFTE 2503 2480 2395 2630
DISP/CLINFTE 61 67 64 57
NUMBER HOSPITALS (n=) 123 35 24 64
*All variables not used in quantitative analysis
Navy are consistently higher than the means for Air Force,
although average outpatient visits per clinician FTE
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(OPV/CLINFTE) is higher for Air Force than Army and Navy which
are both below the total mean. Interestingly, Navy has the
highest average staffing full-time equivalents, particularly
paraprofessionals (PARAFTE) at 6.5, however, assessment of
this staff component is beyond the scope of this research.
B. REGRESSION RESULTS (ALL HOSPITALS)
1. Total Annual Visits
This section begins by acknowledging that every effort
was made to demonstrate the existence of a significant
relationship between administrative/clerical staff and
physician productivity. However, despite all efforts,
administrative/clerical staff does not make a significant
contribution to physician productivity. The basic model began
using the functional relationship described in Chapter III.
Surprisingly, the administrative/clerical staff variable
(ADMFTE) did not turn out to be significant, and even more
surprisingly, though significant, physician input hours
(CLINFTE) turned out to make a negative contribution, as
indicated in Table 10. Although the adjusted R-square is high
(.92), indicating good overall fit (i.e. the independent
variables explain 92 percent of the variation in the dependent
variable), there are significant variance inflation factors,
indicating high multicollinearity among the staffing
variables, as indicated in Table 11. In addition, there are
strong correlations of the staffing variables with case mix
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Table 10. ORIGINAL REGRESSION MODEL
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOTAL ANNUAL VISITS
Root MSE 67506.51517 R-square 0.9297
Dep Mean 291657.02459 Adj R-sq 0.9234
C.V. 23.14586
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard T for HO:
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0 Prob > ITI
INTERCEP 1 148098 66589.991454 2.224 0.0282
OCCUP 1 -9007.883016 15011.635703 -0.600 0.5497
ARMY 1 -87027 17656.533318 -4.929 0.0001*
NAVY 1 72078 22161.525831 3.252 0.0015"*
RCMI 1 -108690 46744.113637 -2.325 0.0219**
MAJTEACH 1 -4795.533853 25617.422900 -0.187 0.8518
CLINFTE 1 -303.732733 174.86349402 -1.737 0.0852***
PROFTE 1 1208.172928 386.60343611 3.125 0.0023**
RNFTE 1 358.898201 338.47807436 1.060 0.2913
PARAFTE 1 551.955580 74.32532802 7.426 0.0001*
ADMFTE 1 14.402647 39.81451827 0.362 0.7182
Variance Variable
Variable DF Inflation Label
INTERCEP 1 0.00000000 Intercept
OCCUP 1 1.04447820 OCCUPANCY RATE
ARMY 1 1.70744595 US ARMY FIXED MEDICAL FACILITIES
NAVY 1 2.01145878 US NAVY FIXED MEDICAL FACILITIES
RCMI 1 3.35153427 DOD ADJUSTED CASE MIX INDEX
MAJTEACH 1 2.86240716 REFER CENTER MORE THAN 1 RESIDENCY
CLINWTE 1 22.97779798 PHYSICIAN FULLTIME EQUIVALENTS
PROFTE 1 8.30329966 PROFESSIONAL FULLTIME EQUIVALENTS
RNFTE 1 36.10789723 REGISTERED NURSE FULLTIME EQUIVALENT
PARAFTE 1 19.44568166 PARAPROFESSIONAL FULLTIME EQUIVALENT
ADMFTE 1 5.03333043 ADMINISTRATIVE FULLTIME EQUIVALENT
* Significant at 1 percent
** Significant at 5 percent
* Significant at 10 percent
(RCMI), with teaching status (MAJTEACH), and with CLINFTE.
These correlations mean that movement in one variable results
in an almost identical movement in the others, though perhaps
in the opposite direction (where the correlations are
negative). Taken together, there seems to be a good deal of
multicollinearity within the model.
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Table 11. CORRELATION AMONG VARIABLES
CORR OCCUP ARMY NAVY RCMI MAJTEACH CLINFTE
OCCUP 1.0000 -0.1515 0.1002 0.0869 -0.0977 0.0984
ARMY -0.1515 1.0000 -0.3057 -0.2712 0.0372 -0.2420
NAVY 0.1002 -0.3057 1.0000 -0.0248 0.1707 -0.1159
RCMI 0.0869 -0.2712 -0.0248 1.0000 -0.6987 0.7768
MAJTEAC -0.0977 0.0372 0.1707 -0.6987 1.0000 -0.7534
CLINFTE 0.0984 -0.2420 -0.1159 0.7768 -0.7534 1.0000
PROOUT -0.0718 0.0179 -0.1288 -0.2690 0.3951 -0.3711
PARAOUT -0.1455 0.1999 -0.6066 -0.3090 0.4139 -0.4408
RNOUT -0.1024 0.1752 -0.4969 -0.2818 0.3047 -0.3504
ADMOUT -0.0354 -0.1935 -0.1340 -0.2465 0.4113 -0.3973
TOTVIS 0.1131 -0.4106 -0.1626 0.6300 -0.6423 0.8647
CORR PROFTE RNFTE PARAFTE ADMFTE TOTVIS
OCCUP 0.1170 0.0994 0.0932 0.1095 0.1131
ARMY -0.3552 -0.2209 -0.2075 -0.3855 -0.4106
NAVY -0.1695 -0.1804 -0.3426 -0.1294 -0.1626
RCMI 0.7193 0.7759 0.6705 0.7143 0.6300
MAJTEACH -0.6624 -0.7693 -0.7233 -0.6224 -0.6423
CLINFTE 0.8969 0.9710 0.9112 0.8450 0.8647
PROFTE 1.0000 0.8914 0.8868 0.8639 0.8944
RNFTE 0.8914 1.0000 0.9488 0.8177 0.8939
PARAPTE 0.8868 0.9488 1.0000 0.7766 0.9286
ADMFTE 0.8639 0.8177 0.7766 1.0000 0.7845
TOTVIS 0.8944 0.8939 0.9286 0.7845 1.0000
There are four remedies for multicollinearity: [Ret. 431
1. Increase Sample Size
2. Do Nothing
3. Drop redundant/irrelevant variables
4. Transform Variables
Increasing sample size or doing nothing are not feasible
solutions. Since MAJTEACH was significant and highly
correlated with other variables, it was dropped from the
model, as was RCMI. Neither of these changes produced
favorable results - ADMFTE was still not significant, and
CLINFTE remained negative. These results are shown in Table
12 and in greater detail in Appendix D. The fourth option was
to transform the staffing variables by adding to CLINFTE
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professional FTE (PROFTE) to create a new variable (DRPROFTE)
and by adding RNFTE to PARAFTE to create the new variable
(RNTEKFTE). The first change was done because the inclusion
of extended providers has been shown to improve productivity
within the Air Force. [Ret. 44) These changes led to
the same basic results. Also, because of the omission of
relevant variables the results may be biased.
Table 12. RESULTS OF VARIATIONS TO BASIC REGRESSION MODEL
Model 4: DROPPED BOTH MAJTEACH AND RCMI
TOTVIS = 50,374 - 8730(OCCUP) - 8241(ARMY) + 75653 (NAVY) - 317(CLINFTE)
t = -0.574 -4.742 3.367 -1.788
+ 1127(PROFTE) + 609(PARAFTE) + 88(RNFTE) + 4.8(ADMFTE)
2.886 8.535 0.272 0.119
Model 5: TRANSFORMED VARIABLES (DRPROFTE) AND (RNTEKFTE)
TOTVIS = 187871 - 6734(OCCUP) - 104650t( MY) + 56915(NAVY) - 121664(RCMI)
t = -0.427 -5.874 2.565 -2.618
+ 4938(MAJTEACH) - 106(DRPROFTE) + 541(RNTEKFTE) + 48(ADMFTE)
0.184 0.773 10.392 1.165
2. Factor Analysis
Given these results, a factor analysis was conducted
to determine the degree to which all the staffing variables
represented a single underlying staffing variable. Factor
analysis is a useful technique to examine the
interrelationships among the five staffing variables. Factor
analysis differs from principal component analysis in that the
former examines interrelationships among variables while the
latter has as its objective the selection of the principal
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components that explain as much of the total variance as
possible. In both cases there is no dependent variable.
I Rt. .15 Rather, a set of variables, X,, X., .... , X, are
standardized, so that their variances equal one and their
covariances are correlation coefficients. Each variable is
then represented as a linear combination of a smaller set of
"common factors" as well as a factor unique to each of the
standardized variables. Thus, the factor model is represented
by: [R"t. 4-I
Xi 111FI + 112F2 +...ImF + e,
xee= ipjfj + iP2f2 +. .. + 1MFM + eP
where,
m = number of common factors
F1, F2 , ... , FM are the common factors
L, is the coefficient of F1
e,, e, .... , e. are unique factors
Breaking each response variable into two parts also breaks the
variance into two parts - the variance due to the common
factors (communality) and the variance due to the unique
factor (specificity). Use of this procedure yielded the
following four results, also indicated in Table 13. The
numbers below correspond to the item numbers in the table.
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1. Partial correlations are high between CLINFTE and
RNFTE (.77), and PARAFTE and RNFTE (.62), and moderate between
ADMFTE and PROFTE (.47).
2. Kaiser's Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) is .84
overall, indicating an adequate sample. That is, the five
staffing variables are sufficient to conduct the factor
analysis. Values less than .5 indicates a need for additional
variables while values equal to or greater than .8 are
considered acceptable, as a general rule Ret. 471
3. The Eigenvalues are all less than one, except for the
first principal component which has a value of 4.5. Values
less than one are not used in the analysis. This means that
91 percent of the standardized variance is explained by only
one principal component.
4. The factor pattern, involving two factors, shows that
all five staffing variables have especially high positive
loadings on the first principal component while the second
component is a contrast of ADMFTE (.41) against RNFTE (-.17)
and PARAFTE (-.23), with very small loadings on CLINFTE and
PROFTE.
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Table 13. RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS ON TWO PRINCIPAL
COMPONENTS
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components
Partial Correlations Controlling all other Variables1
CLINFTE PROFTE RNFTE PARAFTE ADMFTE
CLINFTE 1.00000 0.18220 0.77463 -0.19966 0.23984
PROFTE 0.18220 1.00000 -0.05410 0.35023 0.47017
RNFTE 0.77463 -0.05410 1.00000 0.62808 -0.02302
PARAFTE -0.19966 0.35023 0.62808 1.00000 -0.11659
ADMFTE 0.23984 0.47017 -0.02302 -0.11659 1.00000
Kaiser's Measure of Sampling Adequacy: Over-all MSA = 0.83978694
2 CLINFTE PROFTE RNFTE PARAFTE ADMFTE
0.818345 0.891772 0.768136 0.845260 0.903252
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total = 5 Average = 1
3 1 2 3 4 5
Eigenvalue 4.5265 0.2628 0.1149 0.0759 0.0200
Difference 4.2636 0.1480 0.0390 0.0559
Proportion 0.9053 0.0526 0.0230 0.0152 0.0040
Cumulative 0.9053 0.9579 0.9808 0.9960 1.0000




CLINFTE 0.97305 -0.07957 PHYSICIAN FTE
PROFTE 0.95391 0.08775 PROFESSIONAL FTE
RNFTE 0.97438 -0.16637 REGISTERED NURSE FTE
PARAFTE 0.95174 -0.22684 PARAPROFESSIONAL FTE
ADXFTE 0.90248 0.41189 ADMINISTRATIVE FTE
Variance explained by each factor
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2
4.526454 0.262822
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 4.789277
CLINFTE PROFTE RNFTE PARAFTE ADMFTE
0.953168 0.917639 0.977088 0.957261 0.984122
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These findings are presented graphically in Figures 8
and 9, both before and after factor rotation. Of interest is
the linear relationship of the variables. There is not enough
variability in the data to capture the separate effects of
these variables. Instead, these findings suggest some sort of
uniform pattern in staffing which could have several plausible
explanations, including joint staffing methodology, inaccurate
workload reporting methods, or the manner in which MEPRS
aggregates the data during stepdown.
Although these findings could be used in the original
model by substituting the first principal component for the
five staffing variables little insight would be provided by
doing so. Therefore, the only reasonable conclusion is that
the aggregate data do not provide enough variability to meet
the objectives of this research. However, these findings may
not apply when viewed from the workcenter, the next topic of
discussion.
C. REGRESSION REStTLTS (WORKCRNTEr)
Given the primary care focus in Chapter 2, three primary
care workcenters were selected for separate analysis.
Although multicollinearity still exists within the workcenter
data, it does not appear to be as severe as with the complete
data set of all-CONUS hospitals. However, caution should be
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CLINFTE =A PROFTE =B RNFTE =C PARAFTE =D ADMFTE =E
Figure 9. Rotated Plot of Factor Pattern for FACTORi and FACTOR2
1. Family Practice
Within the family practice workcenter, Navy is
significant and positive, generating 10,824 more total annual
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visits than Air Force. The significance of Navy might be
explained by the increased visits in FY90 versus the declining
Table 14. ESTIMATED PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS, BY WORKCENTER
(t-statistic in parentheses)
Family Internal
Variable Practice Medicine Pediatrics
ARMY -2543 878 -12452
(-0.621) (0.352) (-2.876)*
NAVY 10824 7886 7731
(2.874)* (2.904)* (1.632)
MAJTEACH -3295 -6193 -13355(-0.836) (-1.837)*** (-2.713)*
CLINFTE 1146 1624 0.0196
(2.766)* (4.561)* (0.055)
PROFTE 3832 5439 3316
(3.310)* (2.973)* (1.686)***
RNFTE 1515 1451 2578
(1.118) (1.002) (1.352)
PARAFTE 1144 1595 1278
(2.623)** (2.015)** (1.548)
ADMFTE -965 -656 -1271
(-1.441) (-0.607) (-0.830)
Adj R-square .60 .46 .31
Sample Size (n=) 80 121 119
* Significant at 1 percent
** Significant at 5 percent
* Significant at 10 percent
workload during the same period for Air Force. MAJTEACH was
not significant, but negative, as expected and is consistent
with the findings of Kearl and Mainous (1993). CLINFTE,
PROFTE, and PARAFTE were all significant and positive as
expected; however, increasing the professional group (PROFTE)
by one FTE increases total visits by 3,822, more than twice
that of adding one more clinician. Similar to the findings of
Buchanan and Hosek (1983), this is possibly attributable to
the use of increased physician extenders, physician assistants
and nurse practitioners, for example, to offset physician
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shortages. Finally, RNFTE and ADMFTE were not significant.
Although the negative coefficient for ADMFTE was unexpected,
the true effect of the administrative/clerical component could
be masked by the inclusion of an indirect contribution (via
MEPRS) of non-workcenter personnel. Another explanation could
be that the administrative/clerical staff component is
understaffed, though not sufficiently variable to make a
measurable positive contribution. The adjusted R-square of
.60 indicates that 60 percent of the variation has been
explained by this functional relationship, which is a moderate
fit, consistent with prior research (Pope and Hurdle).
2. Internal Medicine
Within the internal medicine workcenter, Navy is again
significant and positive. MAJTEACH is significant, with a
teaching hospital producing 6,192 fewer total annual visits
than does a non-teaching hospital. CLINFTE, PROFTE, and
PARAFTE are all significant and positively contribute to
physician productivity. However, again the contribution of
ADMFTE is negative, owing possibly to the same reasons
previously discussed.
3. Pediatrics
Within this workcenter ARMY, is significant and
produces 12,452 fewer total annual pediatric visits than
Air Force. MAJTEACH is significant and negative.
Surprisingly, CLINFTE is not significant whereas PROFTE is, at
the 10 percent level. None of the remaining staffing
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variables are significant. Given the relatively poor fit
(adjusted R-square = .31), this model does not adequately
explain the factors influencing total visits, hence physician
productivity. This finding implies that the factors
influencing productivity in one workcenter may differ from the
factors that apply in another.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis evaluated the relationship between the
administrative/clerical staff complement and physician
productivity across military treatment facilities and
Services, using aggregate MEPRS data for fiscal year 1990.
Regrettably, this relationship cannot be established, using
these data, despite all efforts to do so by using regression
analysis. Regression analysis defines the functional
relationship between a set of independent variables and a
dependent variable. The dependent variable here total
hospital visits (TOTVIS), represents physician productivities.
Among the independent variables, the administrative/clerical
staff variable is not significant while physician input
(CLINFTE) is significant, but negative. Correlation among the
five staffing variables was extremely high, however,
indicating strong multicollinearity among these variables.
Factor analysis, useful for describing relationships among
variables, was used to assess the five staffing variables.
For the five, 91 percent of the variation could be explained
using only one principal component, suggesting some sort of
uniformed staffing pattern. Consequently, there is not
sufficient variation between the administrative/clerical staff
and other staff personnel to show a distinct effect of
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administrative/clerical personnel on physician productivity in
this study.
Within the workcenter, however, the results were more
promising. Administrative/clerical staff is negative, but not
significant which is inconsistent with the findings of Pope
and Hurdle (1989). There is significant variation with NAVY,
CLINFTE, PROFTE, and PARAFTE within the workcenter, however;
the models presented provide only moderate explanatory power,
indicating that other factors may be involved.
B. CONCLUSION
Although this effort did not produce the intended results,
it does show that using aggregate MEPRS data will not allow
adequate comparisons at the hospital level due to the lack of
staffing variability. However, it does seem useful when
examining the workcenter. Perhaps this is because MEPRS is a
workcenter-based system. The advantage of using MEPRS data is
its consistency. However, in the aggregate, the data does not
readily lend itself to comparative analysis.
C. FUTURE STUDIES
Although this research does not yield the desired
results, it does provide insight for future research. Other
research opportunities include:
- Analysis of all workcenters, both inpatient and
outpatient, to capture differences in physician productivity
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and staffing.
- A cost benefit analysis, if financial data is available,
comparing workcenter personnel direct costs against
workcenter workload.
- Separation of actual physician patient contact time from
time spent doing non-physician tasks to assess why physician
contribution varies across workcenters.
- Estimation of the effect of actual workcenter staffing
patterns on physician productivity, if actual staffing data
is available (other than MEPRS).
While this list is not exhaustive, continued use of
quantitative methods of analysis and economic theory should
enhance the interpretation of results and allow manpower
becomes more reliable and allow manpower planners to make more
informed decisions regarding manpower policy. This effort
becomes particularly important in a managed care environment.
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APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY
Available Time - Assigned man-hours dedicated to performance
of primary duties, plus time allowed for personal, fatigue,
delay standby, and travel activity - computed by subtracting
non-available hours from assigned hours.
Source: Joint Healthcare Manpower Standards (JHMS), Nov 89
Borrowed Labor - Man-months (1 FTE work-month = 168 hours).
All productive work or service provided to the MTF by
personnel other than permanently assigned personnel (those
carried on staffing documents).
Source: Navy Health Care Planning Matrix (HCPM) FY91
Catchment Area - Defined by OASD(HA) as the five digit zip
code zones whose geographic center lies within 40 miles of the
center of the zip code zone in which the MTF is located.
Source: Navy HCPM FY91
Continuation Rates - Measures the percentage of medical
officers on active at the beginning of the fiscal year (in
question) who were still on active duty at the end of the
fiscal year.
Source: CNA Report CRM 88-231/March 1989
Direct Care/Direct Care System - The direct health care
system, the larger of the two parts of the military health
care system (the other part being CHAMPUS), is made up of
hospitals and clinics operated by the Army, Navy and Air
Force. It includes 140 hospitals and 553 clinics worldwide
and employees more than 54,000 civilians, as well as 146,000
active duty military personnel.
Source: CBO Testimony May 10, 1993
DoD Relative Case Mix Index - The adjustment factor for all
case mix calculations. It is the average RWPs per disposition
for DoD in FY95 and is equal to .8109.
Source: FY1989 Health Data Summary
End Strength - The number of personnel actually assigned as of
the last day of the reporting period.
Source: JHMS
Fiscal Year - The 12 month accounting period used by the
Federal Government (1 October to the next 30 September)
Source: JHMS
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Fixed Medical Treatment Facility - An established land-based
medical center, hospital, clinic, or other facility that
provides medical, surgical, or dental care and that does not
fall within the definition of a non-fixed medical treatment
facility.
Source: JHMS
Full-Time Equivalent - Work force equivalent of one individual
working full-time for a specific period, which may be made up
of several part-time individuals or one full-time individual.
Source: JHMS
Graduate Medical Education (GME) - The years between
undergraduate medical education and continuing medical
education; it includes both residency and fellowship training.
Source: JHMS
Managing to payroll - Facility commander authority to hire the
appropriate civilian staff as budget and needs allow.
Non-availability Statements - Authorization for patients
within the catchment area to seek medical care from sources
outside of the direct care system when said care is
unavailable within the direct care system.
Non-available Time - Assigned man-hours allowed for
participation in those activities directed, recognized and
approved by the Services, which render the individual
unavailable for assigned primary duties. These activities
include official leave, Permanent Change of Station (PCS)
activities, medical visits or treatments, and organizationally
directed duties, such as charge or quarters, watch, parades
and formations, and details. Also included is official
release from active duty to participate in education and
training and drug and alcohol rehabilitation, and other
miscellaneous absences such as Absence Without Official leave
(AWOL) or desertion, and release from duty for civic duties,
such as voting or jury duty.
Source: JHMS
Occupancy rate - Average daily patient load (no patients)
divided by the number of operating beds.
Operating beds - The number of beds for which staffing and
resources are available to deliver care.
Outpatient visits - Reported for each outpatient who presents
him/herself at an MTF for medical advice, diagnosis,
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treatment, or complete physical examination, or one who is
treated or observed in his/her home or quarters by medical
personnel.
Source: Navy HCPM FY91
Primary Care Provider - Physicians, physician extenders and
other professionals who manage the total care for individual
patient. For example, General Medical Officers,
Pediatricians, Physician Assistants, Nurse Practitioners.
Retention Rates - Measures calculated based on actual
population on board during specified period of time.
Source: CNA Report, CRM 88-231/March 1989
Relative Weighted Product (RWP) - The weight assigned to
biometrics dispositions based on methodology documented in
MHSS DRG Based Recourse Allocation Guidance.
Source: FY89 Health Data Summary
Staffing:
a. Clinicians - Physician or dentist practitioners with
admitting privileges and primary responsibility for patient
care. Includes interns and residents.
b. Registered Nurse - One who is a graduate of a school
of nursing, is registered to practice, has a valid license and
is legally entitled to use the designator RN.
c. Direct Care Professionals - Optometrists, podiatrists,
nurse practitioners, physician's assistants, and other non-
physician health care professionals.
d. Direct Care Paraprofessionals - Paraprofessionals
involved in the direct care of patients such as LPNs, hospital
corpsmen, and dental technicians.
e. Administrative/clerical/logistical 
- Personnel of all
ranks rates, and otherwise not classified.
Source: Navy HCPM FY91
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APPENDIX B. JOINT HEALTHCARE MANPOWER STANDARDS (JHMS)
1. Type I standards, also called engineered standards,
are quantitative in nature and have demonstrated statistical
soundness through regression analysis.
2. Type II and Type III standards are used when the work
performed is not applicable to engineered methods. Type II
standards are those for which the statistical standards for
Type I classification do not hold. Generally, the man-hours
are derived by use of the operational audit. Type III
standards differ from Type II standards in terms of the work
method and analysis procedures. In some work centers, the
tasks performed are not as easily measured using regression
analysis. In these cases, workload is estimated using
historical data, staffing patterns, simulation or other less
precise methods.
3. A Manpower Guide classification is assigned to a
manpower model that adequately describes the relationship
between required resources and mission workload. A guide is
used in situations where work center size, changes in systems,
policies or procedures make the establishment of an engineered
standard too costly or in cases where a previously engineered
standard no longer applies, but can be used as a guide.
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DATA SOURCE AND STATISTICAL REQUIREMENTS TABLE
S A B C D
T Standards Which are based Result In a standard equation
E Classified on work measure- with statistical parameters (see
P as ment method Must meet requirements Note 1)
Type I Work Sampling - 3% absolute accuracy Regression analysis used to
(pee Note 2) - 95% confidence level obtain equation and
- complete work cycle
sampled R2>_ 750
- minimum number of V5 150
input location used Fc>F95, m-I, n-m
- at least 15 usable
sampling days (not applicable if n s 5)
For parabola tcat 90. n- i
For multivariate tctg90 n-
2 Time Study - 10% relative accuracy
- 95% confidence level
- minimum number of
input locations used
3 Type II Work Sampling - 3% absolute accuracy Regression analysis used to
- 95% confidence level obtain equation and
- complete work cycle
sampled R2.500
- at least 15 usable days V<.250
- minimum number of FC>F90 rn.i. n-m
input locations used
----- (not applicable if n;5)
4 Time Study -15% relative accuracy
- 95% confidence level For parabola tczt90 , n-I
- minimum number of
input locations used for multivariate tbiat.90, n-1




S A B C D
T Standards Which are based Result In a standard equation
E Classified on work measure- with statistical parameters (see
as ment method Must meet requirements Note 1)
6 Type III Work Sampling - minimum number of Regression analysis used to
Time Study, locations usedl obtain equaton and
Operational Audit
R22.500
Equation must still meet both the
realistic and the economic criteria.
7 Staffing Pattern. Based on logical rationale used to support to support the
Directed Require- applicability of the development method as most appropriate for








8 Manpower The minimum level of study design, measurement, and statistical criteria which
Guide satisfactorily describes relationships between required resources and mission
workload.
NOTES:
1. A standard represents a work center's man-hour requirements in response to varying levels of workload.
Therefore, an equation that consists only of a constant will not be classified unless it was determined with
staffing pattern. directed requirement, or minimum manpower factors.
2. To be classified as a Type I standard, at least 80% of the man-hours must be based on the use of work
sampling, time study, standard time data, or a combination of these engineered methods.
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APPENDIX C. MEDICAL EXPENSE AND PERFORMANCE REPORTING SYSTEM
(MEPRS)
The Medical Expense and Reporting System (MEPRS) was
formally established in 1986 to provide consistent principles,
standards, policies, definitions, and requirements for
accounting and reporting of expense, manpower and performance
by DoD fixed military medical facilities [Ref.ll:p.l-8]. It
applies to all Army, Navy and Air Force fixed MTFs and is the
only source within DoD for tracking healthcare cost and
workload data. Like the JHMS, MEPRS does not apply to DoD
Components not involved in direct patient care or those that
are non-fixed such as field support or medical facilities
afloat.
The MEPRS classifies hospital services into six broad
functional areas: inpatient care, outpatient (ambulatory)
care, dental care, ancillary services, support services and
special programs. Within each of these broad groupings, it
further classifies functions by work center - where services
are rendered and where workload and expenses are ultimately
assigned.
Although all expenses are eventually assigned into one of
the four final accounts (inpatient care, outpatient care,
dental care and special programs), MEPRS maintains
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intermediate accounts for ancillary and support services whose
costs must be distributed among work centers. In addition,
for those costs which cannot be easily identified, local MTFs
establish cost pools which serve as holding accounts until
final allocations are made. Where costs are not directly
assigned to the work center as is the case with ancillary and
support services, they are allocated based on established
performance factors.
The collection of all manpower data begins at the MTF work
center level. On a daily basis all work hours are recorded by
the work center supervisor which includes work performed by
personnel (military and civilian) who are assigned, detailed,
contracted, borrowed and those who volunteer. A further
distinction is made between time that an individual was not
available to contribute to the work center. This non-
available time is not included the expense portion of MEPRS.
Based on the assumption that each person works an average of
168 hours per month, all work hours are expressed in terms of
its Full-time Equivalent (FTE) ratio.
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APPENDIX D. REGRESSION RESULTS
MODEL 2: DROPPED MAJTEACH
Dependent Variable: TOTVIS
Root MSE 67215.07861 R-square 0.9297
Dep Mean 291657.02459 Adj R-sq 0.9240
C.V. 23.04593
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard T for HO:
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0 Prob > ITI
INTERCEP 1 140149 51072.507002 2.744 0.0071
OCCUP 1 -8815.087785 14911.610055 -0.591 0.5556
ARMY 1 -86263 17104.956999 -5.043 0.0001*
NAVY 1 72179 22059.268588 3.272 0.0014*
RCMI 1 -106044 44363.712117 -2.390 0.0185**
CLINFTE 1 -302.423659 173.96929924 -1.738 0.0849**
PROFTE 1 1203.351015 384.07905674 3.133 0.0022*
RNFTE 1 364.078181 335.88872660 1.084 0.2807
PARAFTE 1 553.230744 73.69299681 7.507 0.0001*
ADMFTE 1 14.599098 39.62885946 0.368 0.7133
Variance Variable
Variable DF Inflation Label
INTERCEP 1 0.00000000 Intercept
OCCUP 1 1.03956196 OCCUPANCY RATE
ARMY 1 1.61635972 US ARMY FIXED MEDICAL FACILITIES
NAVY 1 2.01025891 US NAVY FIXED MEDICAL FACILITIES
RCMI 1 3.04511375 DOD ADJUSTED CASE MIX INDEX
CLINFTE 1 22.94104982 PHYSICIAN FULLTIME EQUIVALENTS
PROFTE 1 8.26643970 PROFESSIONAL FULLTIME EQUIVALENTS
RNFTE 1 35.86657671 REGISTERED NURSE FULLTIME EQUIVALENT
PARAFTE 1 19.28234707 PARAPROFESSIONAL FULLTIME EQUIVALENT
ADMFTE 1 5.02983357 ADMINISTRATIVE FULLTIME EQUIVALENT
* Significant at 1 percent
** Significant at 5 percent
Significant at 10 percent
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MODEL 3: DROPPED RCMI
Dependent Variable: TOTVIS
Root MSE 68821.71478 R-square 0.9263
Dep Mean 291657.02459 Adj R-sq 0.9203
C.V. 23.59680
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard T for HO:Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0 Prob > ITI
INTERCEP 1 34640 46196.374663 0.750 0.4549
OCCUP 1 -8204.212492 15300.043714 
-0.536 0.5929
ARMY 1 -80572 17776.660422 
-4.532 0.0001*
NAVY 1 75693 22537.617224 3.359 0.0011*
MAJTEACH 1 13215 24894.027542 0.531 0.5966
CLINFTE 1 -312.586047 178.22801641 
-1.754 0.0822**
PROFTE 1 1119.344964 392.20650134 2.854 0.0051*
RNFTE 1 120.899371 328.91657053 0.368 0.7139
PARAFTE 1 608.652191 71.57974838 8.503 0.0001*
ADMFTE 1 6.017129 40.42335280 0.149 0.8819
Variance Variable
Variable DF Inflation Label
INTERCEP 1 0.00000000 Intercept
OCCUP 1 1.04392450 OCCUPANCY RATE
ARMY 1 1.66524002 US ARMY FIXED MEDICAL FACILITIES
NAVY 1 2.00155818 US NAVY FIXED MEDICAL FACILITIES
MAJTEACH 1 2.60070603 REFER CENTER MORE THAN 1 RESIDENCY
CLINFTE 1 22.96690373 PHYSICIAN FULLTIME EQUIVALENTS
PROFTE 1 8.22222333 PROFESSIONAL FULLTIME EQUIVALENTS
RNFTE 1 32.80598041 REGISTERED NURSE FULLTIME EQUIVALENT
PARAFTE 1 17.35282701 PARAPROFESSIONAL FULLTIME EQUIVALENT
ADMFTE 1 4.99203447 ADMINISTRATIVE FULLTIME EQUIVALENT
* Significant at 1 percent
** Significant at 5 percent
* Significant at 10 percent
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MODEL 4: DROPPED BOTH MAJTEACH AND RCMI
Dependent Variable: TOTVIS
Root MSE 68602.66434 R-square 0.9261
Dep Mean 291657.02459 Adj R-sq 0.9209
C.V. 23.52169
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard T for HO:
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0 Prob > ITI
INTERCEP 1 50374 35324.012005 1.426 0.1566
OCCUP 1 -8729.634393 15219.401073 -0.574 0.5674
ARMY 1 -82411 17380.401917 -4.742 0.0001*
NAVY 1 75653 22465.754917 3.367 0.0010*
CLINFTE 1 -317.210230 177.44842900 -1.788 0.0765***
PROFTE 1 1127.411588 390.66463088 2.886 0.0047*
PARAFTE 1 608.970691 71.34941306 8.535 0.0001*
RNFTE 1 87.615692 321.85799374 0.272 0.7860
ADMFTE 1 4.802142 40.23005397 0.119 0.9052
Variance Variable
Variable DF Inflation Label
INTERCEP 1 0.00000000 Intercept
OCCUP 1 1.03955599 OCCUPANCY RATE
ARMY 1 1.60200966 US ARMY FIXED MEDICAL FACILITIES
NAVY 1 2.00153536 US NAVY FIXED MEDICAL FACILITIES
CLINFTE 1 22.91204394 PHYSICIAN FULLTIME EQUIVALENTS
PROFTE 1 8.20989158 PROFESSIONAL FULLTIME EQUIVALENTS
PARAFTE 1 17.35160791 PARAPROFESSIONAL FULLTIME EQUIVALENT
RNFTE 1 31.61397659 REGISTERED NURSE FULLTIME EQUIVALENT
ADMFTE 1 4.97603189 ADMINISTRATIVE FULLTIME EQUIVALENT
* Significant at 1 percent
** Significant at 5 percent
* Significant at 10 percent
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MODEL 5: TRANSFORMED VARIABLES (DRPROFTE)
Dependent Variable: TOTVIS
Root MSE 71010.67007 R-square 0.9208
Dep Mean 291657.02459 Adj R-sq 0.9152
C.V. 24.34732
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard T for HO:
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0 Prob > ITI
INTERCEP 1 187871 66970.026797 2.805 0.0059
OCCUP 1 -6733.591161 15777.870308 -0.427 0.6704
ARMY 1 -104650 17815.833105 -5.874 0.0001*
NAVY 1 56915 22185.708436 2.565 0.0116**
RCMI 1 -121664 46477.588370 -2.618 0.0101**
MAJTEACH 1 4937.922685 26786.096466 0.184 0.8541
DRPROFTE 1 -105.734297 136.69815814 -0.773 0.4408
RNTEKFTE 1 540.774004 52.03979188 10.392 0.0001*
ADMFTE 1 47.537753 40.78837208 1.165 0.2463
Variance Variable
Variable DF Inflation Label
INTERCEP 1 0.00000000 Intercept
OCCUP 1 1.04275977 OCCUPANCY RATE
ARMY 1 )..57105908 US ARMY FIXED MEDICAL FACILITIES
NAVY 1 1.8218079) US NAVY FIXED MEDICAL FACILITIES
RCMI 1 2.99447805 DOD ADJUSTED CASE MIX INDEX
MAJTEACH 1 2.82828746 REFER CENTER MORE THAN 1 RESIDENCY
DRPROFTE 1 19.81804856 COMBINED CLINFTE AND PROFTE
RNTEKFTE 1 14.27843545 COMBINED RNFTE AND PARAFTE
ADMFTE 1 4.77407693 ADMINISTRATIVE FULLTIME EQUIVALENT
* Significant at 1 percent
Significant at 5 percent
Significant at 10 percent
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MODEL 6: TRANSFORMED VARIABLES INTO OUTPUT RATIOS
Dependent Variable: TOTVIS
Root MSE 105965.61336 R-square 0.8268
Dep Mean 291657.02459 Adj R-sq 0.8112
C.V. 36.33227
Parameter Estimates
Parameter Standard T for HO:
Variable DF Estimate Error Parameter=0 Prob > ITI
INTERCEP 1 529757 108426.26151 4.886 0.0001
OCCUP 1 4722.569004 23533.422161 0.201 0.8413
ARMY 1 -165593 26314.461728 -6.293 0.0001*
NAVY 1 -75395 44477.680015 -1.695 0.0929***
RCMI 1 -180928 72086.896160 -2.510 0.0135**
MAJTEACH 1 -67242 43233.103348 -1.555 0.1227
CLINFTE 1 1222.150490 121.08200315 10.094 0.0001*
PROOUT 1 54180 48381.798800 1.120 0.2652
PARAOUT 1 5876.252590 12059.292405 0.487 0.6270
RNOUT 1 -1296.990180 49274.135539 -0.026 0.9790
ADMOUT 1 -10794 8729.2135081 -1.237 0.2189
Variance Variable
Variable DF Inflation Label
INTERCEP 1 0.00000000 Intercept
OCCUP 1 1.04177753 OCCUPANCY RATE
ARMY 1 1.53916981 US ARMY FIXED MEDICAL FACILITIES
NAVY 1 3.28819481 US NAVY FIXED MEDICAL FACILITIES
RCMI 1 3.23492283 DOD ADJUSTED CASE MIX INDEX
MAJTEACH 1 3.30868042 REFER CENTER MORE THAN 1 RESIDENCY
CLINFTE 1 4.47126864 PHYSICIAN FULLTIME EQUIVALENTS
PROOUT 1 1.62875428 PROFESSIONAL FTE PER CLINICIAN FTE
PARAOUT 1 4.98794066 TECHNICIAN FTE PER CLINICIAN FTE
RNOUT 1 2.26210695 REGIS NURSE FTE PER CLINICIAN FTE
ADMOUT 1 1.74945712 ADMIN FTE PER CLINICIAN FTE
* Significant at 1 percent
Significant at 5 percent
Significant at 10 percent
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